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PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
A. Leon Hebert*
DISCIPLINARY ACTION
Several serious misdeeds committed by an attorney during the course
of his representation of his client and in the proceedings in which he sought a
divorce from his wife resulted in disbarment.' The attorney was called upon
to handle a real estate transaction which involved a collateral mortgage and
the issuance of a title opinion to a bank. The title was passed on the real
estate on December 30, 1970. When called upon to furnish the collateral
mortgage which was to have been imposed upon the property, he dated the
mortgage January 14, 1971, and issued a title letter which omitted reference
to a second mortgage which primed the collateral mortgage. In fact, there
was no pretense of any title examination. Recordation of the mortgage dated
January 14, 1971, did not occur until some six weeks thereafter. He forged
the name of an associate as the notary who executed the mortgage and had
his secretary affix the name of that associate to the title letter.
Another offense arose out of respondent's divorce from his first wife.
The attorney attached a consent and waiver to divorce with forgeries of the
signatures of both his wife and the notary public. In addition, evidence
showed that respondent was not a bona fide resident of Mississippi for the
year preceeding the divorce though he claimed residence to establish
Mississippi jurisdiction.
Stressing the necessity of acting in accordance with Disciplinary Rule
6-101, and Ethical Consideration 9-6,2 the supreme court explained "that a
* Special Lecturer in Law, Louisiana State University; Member, Baton Rouge
Bar.
1. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Gremillion, 320 So. 2d 171 (La. 1975).
2. LA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, E.C. 9-6 (found in ARTICLES OF
INCORPORATION, LOUISIANA STATE BAR Ass'N art. XVI; LA. R.S. 37, Ch. 4, app.)
[hereinafter cited as CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY] provides: "Every
lawyer owes a solemn duty to uphold the integrity and honor of his profession; to
encourage respect for the law and for the courts and the judges thereof; to observe
the Code of Professional Responsibility; to act as a member of a learned profession,
one dedicated to public service; to cooperate with his brother lawyers in supporting
the organized bar through the devoting of his time, efforts, and financial support as
his professional standing and ability reasonably permit; to conduct himself so as to
reflect credit on the legal profession and to inspire the confidence, respect, and trust
of his clients and of the public; and to strive to avoid not only professional
impropriety but also the appearance of impropriety."
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disbarment proceeding is not so much for the punishment of the attorney as
it is for the preservation of the integrity of the courts and the salutary effect it
has upon other members of the bar." The court struck the respondent's
name from the roll of attorneys and revoked his license.
In Louisiana State Bar Association v. Edwards,3 the supreme court
reviewed the disciplinary procedure provided in Article 15 of the Articles of
Incorporation of the Louisiana State Bar Association, and clarified the
meaning of several of its provisions. 4 It reaffirmed unequivocally that in
proceedings commenced after September 1, 1971, new procedures would
be applicable.5 Inasmuch as Edwards entered a plea of nolo contendere to a
felony charge of interstate transportation of motor vehicles on September 3,
1971, the Committee properly proceeded under Article 15, Section 8, as
amended. The court easily disposed of the pardon issued by the Governor of
Louisiana for a crime committed against a federal jurisdiction 6 and also
rejected the claim that a plea of nolo contendere may not be used as a
conviction in a disbarment proceeding.
The Committee on Professional Responsibility brought disciplinary
proceedings against R. C. Edwins7 alleging several violations of the Code of
Professional Responsibility including solicitation, carelessness in account-
ing to his client for proceeds of a settlement and advancement of living
expenses to his clients. The commissioner found the respondent had
committed the deeds with which he was charged and the Committee
concurred in his findings. Though no formal exceptions to the findings of
the commissioner were filed by the attorney,8 he contested both the findings
of fact and conclusions of law made by the commissioner in his briefs and
oral arguments to the court. After finding that a failure of a respondent
attorney to object to the findings of fact operated as a confirmation of those
facts, the court nevertheless explained that the ultimate responsibility as to
the discipline warranted by the facts rests with the court.9
3. 322 So. 2d 123 (La. 1975).
4. Id. at 125-27.
5. 263 La. 743, 269 So. 2d 228 (1972).
6. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Ponder, 263 La. 743, 269So. 2d 228(1972). The
inherent power of the Governor to grant a pardon for a crime committed against
another jurisdiction has not been decided.
7. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Edwins, 329 So. 2d 437 (La. 1976).
8. ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION, LOUISIANA STATE BAR Ass'N, LA. R.S. 37,"
Ch. 4, app. Art. XV, Sec. 6(d) [hereinafter cited as ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION].
9. The charges considered by the Commissioner were:
"1. That in July, 1970 the respondent Edwins (a) improperly solicited employ-
ment as attorney from Ralph Thomas to represent him in a seamen's suit, (b)
improperly advanced financial assistance to Thomas during his representation of
[Vol. 37
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In light of the evidence, this writer cannot share the conclusion that the
court bore the "ultimate responsibility" in a manner which will set the tone
for strict adherence to the disciplinary rules which were under review. 10 In
fact, as to the rule dealing with advancement of funds, the opinion
practically invites future violation under the guise of making counsel
available. The use of the advancement of living expenses as means of
solicitation is totally disregarded.
The conclusion reached by the court is a disregard of everyday
happenings. Given a chance to explain his advances to clients, the lawyer
charged will surely meet the court's humanitarian test and deny that such
advances had anything whatever to do with an inducement to obtain
professional employment. In effect, DR 5-103(B) has been silently repealed
and is ingloriously committed to the reliquary of dead laws. Repeal of a DR
would be preferable to the emasculation administered to the prohibition
against advancing living expenses. The court could modify the rule by
allowing advancements of living expenses in extreme situations by requir-
ing counsel to obtain court approval of such advances after a recommenda-
tion by an appropriate committee of the bar.
No discussion of Edwins would be complete without commenting on a
ninety-day suspension. In instances where the solicitation of a case pro-
duces a substantial contingent fee, and the sanction administered is only
suspension, it is nothing more than a ninety-day vacation. Perhaps if
punishment is the object of a suspension for proven violations of the DRs,
the court should consider a longer minimum. The court's comment that this
was the first punishment administered for solicitation is a mild warning that
other solicitors may not fare as well.
For the advances made by Edwins to his clients, which the court found
to be a deliberate violation, the court administered a 30-day suspension to
run concurrently with the 90-day suspension levied for solicitation of
Thomas' case. Because Edwins did not justify the advances, the court
properly applied the presumption that the advances were made with the
intention of securing or keeping the legal representation of Seltzer. At least
the court was aware of the conflict which occurs in retaining a client when
him, and (c) when the suit was settled in May 1972, improperly neglected to
account to Thomas for the withholding of advances and expenses (in addition to
his fee) from the proceeds of the settlement.
2. That, during his representation of Donald Seltzer in a seamen's suit from
March-June, 1972, Edwins improperly advanced some funds to his client." 329
So. 2d at 442.
10. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-103, 5-103(B), and
9-102(B)(3).
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another lawyer is known to advance funds for any purpose.
By way of justification for the lenient punishment administered, the
court adverted to EC 5-7 and EC 5-8 commenting:
Nevertheless, under the circumstances here shown, we are un-
willing to hold that the spirit of the intent of the disciplinary rule is
violated by the advance or guarantee by a lawyer to a client (who has
already retained him) of minimal living expenses, of minor sums,
necessary to prevent foreclosures, or of necessary medical treatment.
(Emphasis added).
No mention is made of "living expenses" per se. Nevertheless, the opinion
glides right into the matter of living expenses in this language:
We do not believe any bar disciplinary rule can or should
contemplate depriving poor people from access to the court so as to
effectively to assert their claim. Cf., Canon 2: 'A lawyer should assist
the legal profession in fulfilling its duty to make legal counsel
available.' Nor do we see how a lawyer's guarantee of necessary
medical treatment for his client, even for a non-litigation related
illness, can be regarded as unethical, if the lawyer for reasons of
humanity can afford to do so."'
The court finds that the advances made were "akin to expenses of
litigation" rather than prohibited advances made with improper motive of
buying representation of the client or of advertising to attract other clients.
That reasoning flows from a willingness to magnify the human kindness of
the advances rather than the reality of the situation-that the lawyer who
does advance living expenses, for whatever motive, obtains the big cases.
This places the practitioner who cannot afford to or is unwilling to make
advances at a distinct disadvantage in acquiring a clientele.
The correct conclusion was reached by the dissenting Justices' 2 as to
the discipline applied by the majority of the court:
It seems to me that there is no question about the violation of
disciplinary rules-. . .violations we should not condone. The dis-
ciplinary rules should be enforced in such a way as to give them
meaning and significance in regulating the conduct of the members of
the bar.
Members of the bar who adhere to the rules are puzzled by the court's
failure to accept its responsibility for discipline. Edwins certainly makes a
mockery of the true meaning of the Code.
11. 329 So. 2d at 446.
12. Justice Dixon dissented and was joined by Justice Dennis.
[Vol. 37
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CIVIL ACTION TO RECOVER SETTLEMENT PROCEEDS
The conduct of an attorney in withholding proceeds of a settlement
arising out of a claim of a wife and minor child for the death of their father in
an accident which occurred on an offshore oil platform was an issue in Gray
v. Atkins.13 The Third Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of a
District Court awarding $60,500 to plaintiff, and an additional $15,000 to
plaintiff's minor daughter. The sordid circumstances under which the
plaintiff employed defendant attorney are discussed in detail in the opinion
of Judge Hood.' 4
Just three weeks after the death of her husband, plaintiff was ap-
proached by two investigators who advised her that she probably had a legal
claim for the death of her husband. Explaining that they operated under the
trade name of Dugas Detective Agency, they persuaded plaintiff to sign a
document employing their agency to do a full investigation of the accident
of January 24, 1974, when her husband died. Charges for this service were
to have been $100.00 per day, plus expenses. The contract also gratuitously
provided, "I, Pam Gray, also asked Mr. Dugas to recommend an attorney
to represent me and my daughter, Mary Gray." This occurred on February
13, 1974.
Having obtained the plaintiff's signature on their own contract, Dugas
and Mire took the plaintiff to the office of Hornsby, the lawyer whom they
recommended, where she signed a contract to have him handle her own
claim and that of her minor daughter agreeing to pay a contingency fee of 1/3
of the recovery.
Later Dugas advised the plaintiff that Hornsby was not handling her
claims properly and suggested that she hire Atkins to represent her. In the
interim between the date that she first hired Hornsby and the entering into a
new contract with Atkins, the record discloses that Hornsby and Atkins
were trading out cases which had been brought to them by Dugas, who by
then had become Atkins' employee. The plaintiff's case fell to Atkins in the
swapout.
On April 30, 1974, Atkins accepted employment in the following
manner. Dugas produced a printed form contract labeled "Attorney Con-
tract of Employment with an Interest." Neither the names of the contracting
parties nor a description of the cause of action was contained in the blanks
provided in the form. The fee to be charged, however, was stipulated to
13. 331 So. 2d 157 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976).
14. As of this writing, no criminal charges have been filed against the inves-
tigators despite the strong factual conclusion of the appellate court.
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range from one-third to one-half of the gross amount of the settlement. All
of the contract negotiations except a telephone call by Mrs. Gray were
handled by Dugas.
In due course Atkins filed suit and reached a settlement with the
defendant employer of his client's deceased husband for the sum of
$67,500 for the plaintiff and $15,000 for the child. Even the exe-
cution of the settlement papers was attended to by Dugas who took Mrs.
Gray to the courthouse to assist her in completing the settlement. Counsel
for Pennzoil, the employer, insisted on Atkins' presence to complete the
judgment of dismissal. Thus, Atkins made an appearance personally at the
courthouse where he received the draft for $82,500.
Atkins then had his client execute another agreement in which she
purportedly authorized Atkins to retain the proceeds of the settlement until
other claims were paid or in which she agreed to indemnify Atkins for
amounts he might be required to pay intervenors including Hornsby and
Gray's parents who claimed a part of the settlement. Neither plaintiff nor her
grandfather were ever given the opportunity to read this last agreement.
Dugas had already signed the February 3, 1975, agreement as undertutor of
the minor and was aware that plaintiff did not know that she had signed such
an agreement.
From the $82,500 received by Atkins, plaintiff received only the
sum of $6,000.00. She sued him for the unpaid balance.15
Atkins' answer is cryptically summarized by the court:
Defendant Atkins answered, alleging that he received
$89,517.73 in settlement of all of plaintiff's claims, that he is entitled
to retain one-half that amount, or $44,758.86, as attorney's fees and
that he is entitled to withhold the additional sum of $24,386.46 as
reimbursement for advances made and expenses incurred in connec-
tion with this matter, leaving a net balance due plaintiff of $20,373.40.
He contends that he is entitled to retain even that net balance due
plaintiff until the claim of Hornsby for attorney's fees is settled. Atkins
also contends that he is entitled to recover damages from plaintiff under
his reconventional demand, and to offset the amount due him as
damages from the amount which he may owe Mrs. Gray.
The trial court rendered judgment against Atkins for the full
$75,500.00 and rejected Atkins' reconventional demand.
The Court of Appeal had no difficulty in finding the February 3, 1975,
15. Atkins is under indictment in Lafayette Parish in * 41, 193 for theft arising
out of the manner in which he dealt with his client.
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agreement a nullity for lack of consent by Mrs. Gray. It also found the
contract of April 30, 1974, null and void.16
The court relied on LA. R.S. 37:213 in finding that Dugas was
unlawfully engaged in the practice of law. Again the court went to the core
of the problem:
The evidence also convinces us that Atkins actively asserted and
conspired with Dugas in the latter's illegal practice of law and that the
contract between plaintiff and Atkins dated April 30, 1974, was
entered into pursuant to that illegal relationship.
For his participation in assisting the unauthorized practice of law and
because of the invalidity of both of the original contracts of employment,
Atkins was denied any recovery whatever for the legal services.
The court deserves the unreserved commendation of the whole bar for
its forthright treatment of the matters of professional responsibility.
FITNESS To PRACTICE AFTER CENSURE
The paradox presented by the censure of Judge Joseph B. Dupont, 7
allowing retention of his office of City Judge and of his right to practice law
under peculiar factual circumstances, is an interesting one.
The Judiciary Commission, after a three-day hearing, determined that
Judge Dupont was guilty of willful misconduct relating to his official duties
for willful and persistent failure to perform his duties. The factual findings
upon which the commission reached the conclusion were that the judge
received information from one Warren Ard on February 3, 1974, that two
guns in his possession, a Browning automatic shotgun and a Winchester
rifle, were stolen property and that after having received that information
Judge Dupont did not report it to the proper authorities.
The second factual finding was that having received the information
concerning the true ownership of the guns, Judge Dupont transferred the
guns to Warren Ard for a consideration when it was his official duty to report
the possession of the stolen articles to the proper authorities.
The third finding was that transfer of the guns to Ard for a considera-
tion was made under circumstances designed to keep the transaction secret
even to the extent of wiping the weapons for fingerprints.
The commission further concluded that the willful continuation of the
16. The exact language of the court was "[W]e have concluded that the contract
was executed in violation of prohibiting law and that it is also void."
17. In re Dupont, 322 So. 2d 180 (La. 1975). Judge Dupont presides in the City
Court of Plaquemine, Louisiana.
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possession and concealment of weapons for a period of five days, knowing
that such concealment and possession may have been a criminal act,' 8 and
giving up the possession of the guns only upon receipt of a sum of money
were serious charges.
Speaking through Justice Calogero, the majority of the court agreed
with the commission's factual findings and proceeded to censure the judge
as recommended by the Judiciary Commission. The court concluded:
His conduct and personal behavior in the particulars above
enumerated, while not constitutionally warranting his removal from
office was disparaging and inconsistent with the high degree of trust
placed in him by the electorate.
Justice Barham in a dissent concluded that the facts developed in the
case warranted at least a suspension and perhaps the removal of the judge.
In a "concurring" opinion, Justice Dixon found that the record in the
case reflected no mitigating circumstances and no redeemable qualities on
the part of the respondent-no recognition of wrongdoing, no remorse, no
regrets, no disputes of the basic facts giving rise to disciplinary action. It
was his conclusion that the respondent judge should have been removed 9
from office.
The paradox arises when one considers the necessity for maintaining
good moral character in the practice of law. Can a judge who has failed in his
judicial duties to the extent that he has received a censure (with two votes for
removal from office) be considered to possess good moral character
sufficient to enable him to continue to practice law? Would a lawyer faced
with the same factual dilemma have been treated the same way? 20
The Committee on Professional Responsibility undoubtedly must have
considered the filing of disciplinary action against the judge for his admitted
misconduct as a lawyer, but since only an order of censure was issued for his
conduct as a judge, the committee must have despaired at the hope of
obtaining the greater measure of discipline for his violation of his duties as a
lawyer.
FITNESS To PRACTICE AFTER REMOVAL
The Judiciary Commission made a specific recommendation concern-
18. LA. R.S. 14:69 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1972, No. 654, § 1.
19. A conclusion which was also reached by Justice Barham in a dissenting
opinion.
20. For other cases dealing with judicial misconduct see In re Haggerty, 257 La.
1, 241 So. 2d 469 (1970), and State v. O'Hara, 252 La. 540, 211 So. 2d 641 (1968).
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ing the conduct of a sitting judge stating that he was suffering from a
permanent disability that seriously interfered with the performance of his
duties.2 Without reciting the specific disability, the court ordered that the
judge be involuntarily retired for permanent disability. The same question
might be asked concerning the judge's fitness to practice law under those
conditions which were described by the Judiciary Commission's Report as
being a very serious form of alcoholism.
MALPRACTICE SUITS ON THE RISE
Two cases dealing with legal malpractice suggest that the frequency of
such claims against attorneys is increasing. In the Muse22 case, the lawyer
advised the client to pay a part of the proceeds of a health insurance policy to
Charity Hospital thinking that the hospital had a lien on such proceeds for
services rendered to the client. Subsequently, the client consulted a different
lawyer who pointed out that no such lien existed. The court held that the first
lawyer was negligent and that he was thus indebted to his client for the
amount mistakenly paid.
In Zito23 the issue arose as to whether the failure of the attorney to file a
claim timely for his client gave rise to an action ex contractu or ex delicto.
The trial court had upheld a plea of liberative prescription of one year. The
appellate court remanded to allow the plaintiff an opportunity to establish a
claim ex contractu if the facts were available. On remand the trial court
dismissed plaintiff's suit with a finding that plaintiff himself had furnished
counsel the wrong date (regarding the occurrence of an accident) and,
therefore, the lawyer had not breached his contract. Judgment was rendered
July 20, 1976.24 Another appeal is anticipated.
FEES
Various aspects of attorney fees received the attention of several of the
Circuit Courts of Appeal .25 In Pierson, the court determined that the lawyer
21. In re Alexander, 323 So. 2d 448 (La. 1975).
22. Muse v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 328 So. 2d 698 (La. App. Ist Cir.
1976).
23. Jackson v. Zito, 314 So. 2d 401 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 320 So. 2d
551, 553 (La. 1975) (judgment not final).
24. No. 175,040 (19th Judicial District Court).
25. Krebs v. Bailey's Equip. Rentals, Inc., 328 So. 2d 775 (La. App. Ist Cir.
1976); Mire v. Travelers Ins. Co., 318 So. 2d 93 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975); Pierson v.
Dept. of Revenue, 316 So. 2d 404 (La. App. I st Cir. 1975); Baghramain v. MFA Mut.
Ins. Co., 315 So. 2d 849 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975); Schoenberger v. Martin, 314 So. 2d
368 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975); Smith v. Westside Transit Lines, Inc., 313 So. 2d 371
(La. App.. 4th Cir. 1975).
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hired by the Department of Revenue under special contract to collect an
alleged tax liability from the American Telephone & Telegraph Co., was
entitled to the full statutory fee, under LA. R.S. 47:1512, of 10% of the
recovery despite dismissal by the Collector of Revenue. While the attorney
was negotiating a settlement of the claim, the Collector of Revenue, who
had hired him, intervened and attempted unsuccessfully to get the lawyer to
lower his fee from the $154,304 due under the statute. The lawyer was
then discharged a few days before a consent judgment was entered in an
amount which gave rise to the stated fee. The trial court found that the
plaintiff lawyer had earned the entire fee.
On appeal the court stated that LA. R.S. 37:218 and 47:1512 are inpari
materiae and should be so construed; though discharge of the attorney was
permissible, the fee was earned. The discharge is effective whether the fee is
on a contingency or on a fixed fee basis.
Where an attorney's fee was being claimed under LA. R.S. 22:658-
providing for penalty and attorney fees in insurance matters26-- the contract
with the lawyer was on a one-third contingency basis. Plaintiff recovered
$45,363 but the court awarded the sum of $10,000 as being a reasonable
fee assessable under the statute but a footnote indicated that the
award against the insurance company was not in total satisfaction of the
contractual obligation of the client to the attorney. This language indicates
the rationale of the court:
The fee is determined by many considerations other than time
visibly employed in the litigation. Absent other evidence, the court
will be guided by the amount of labor performed as indicated by the
record.27
Another situation arose in which the attorney employed by written
contract on a contingency fee basis was dismissed before the case was
settled by a second lawyer. The dismissed advocate had not filed his
contract and intervened to protect his fee. The firing by the client arose out
of disappointment that a jury trial date was upset. The lawyer sensed that his
client would be unhappy. The court found that the dismissed attorney had
been lax in communicating with his client and, therefore, he had been
dismissed for cause. The following language sets the bar's responsibility in
focus:
We regret that it is necessary for this Court to decide a case of this
nature. We recognize that the ramifications of our opinion extend far
26. 315 So. 2d at 852 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
27. Id. at 853.
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beyond the narrow issue of the amount of appellant's fee. Perhaps the
organized Bar should have machinery available for the mandatory
arbitration of such matters. In the long run, it would certainly be
beneficial to the public image of the Bar if a case such as this could be
disposed of in some way other than by litigation.
Schoenberger2 8 simply involved a division of inheritance tax fees due
an incumbent and a past attorney to assist the tax collector. The facts
indicated that the incumbent attorney to assist the tax collector was not made
aware of the governor's action in excluding certain successions from those
which would normally fall to the appointee by virtue of the time of
completion of the succession and payment of any tax due. Since both
attorneys, the old and the new, had done some work, the court affirmed the
trial court's decree splitting the fee between them.
That the attorney is bound by the statement he sends to his client is
essentially the holding in Krebs.29 After his discharge by the client, a new
statement of charges included some which had already been billed and paid.
The court stated again that a contingency fee contract can be revoked at any
time; upon revocation the lawyer is relegated to a recovery on quantum
meruit for the services rendered. 3 °
MISCELLANEOUS CASES AFFECTING PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
In Mire v. Travelers Insurance Company, 31 plaintiff's attorney in a
case brought against the executive officers of his employer sought to impose
an attorney's fee on the portion of the award paid to the workmen's
compensation carrier who had intervened. Travelers had the tort and
compensation coverage as well and had contributed $100,000.00 toward the
overall settlement of plaintiff's claim ex delicto. The attorney alleged that
his efforts produced the recovery of the amount awarded the intervenor for
compensation. Travelers contended that it was hurt by the action, not
helped. The court refused to allow plaintiff any recovery on the theory of
unjust enrichment.32
An interesting result was obtained in Oil Purchasers, Inc. v. Kuehl-
ing, 33 a case in which the heirs of an attorney sought recovery of fees for
28. 314 So. 2d at 368.
29. 328 So. 2d at 775 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1976).
30. See, e.g., Tennant v. Russell, 214 La. 1046, 39 So. 2d 726 (1949); Succession
of Carbajal, 139 La. 481,71 So. 774 (1916); Louque v. Dejan, 129 La. 519, 56 So. 427
(1911).
31. 318 So. 2d 93 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
32. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1965.
33. 321 So. 2d 17 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
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services rendered during the attorney's lifetime. The case had been in
process for several years, but was not consummated until after the death of
the lawyer who was operating under a contingency fee contract which
provided for 25% of all land and monies recovered by the attorney's efforts.
The trial court awarded a fee of 20% of lands and monies instead of the 25%
provided in the contract. The attorney's heirs appealed and the court of
appeal held that quantum meruit was the basis for the award of fees but that
there could be no award of an interest in the land itself; 34 the value of the
land must be commuted into a money award. It found that the attorney had
performed 80% of his contract, but had to remand the case to allow the value
of lands and other rights to be made.
Judge Culpepper reviewed the doctrine of quantum meruit very
thoroughly and concluded that no expert testimony was necessary where
services for which payment is claimed were rendered under the eye of the
court.
35
CONCLUSION
The cause of professional responsibility has been dealt several severe
blows by the opinions of our supreme court within the last year. Particular-
ly, the lenient attitude of the court toward those who have violated the Code
of Professional Responsibility in the area of solicitation will only breed
other violations. When the court rationalizes that advancement of living
expenses may be the only way of making legal services available to the poor
and the indigent, it overlooks the fact that the practitioner who has the
largest bank account will soon acquire the largest personal injury practice.
This attitude, coupled with a slap on the wrist suspension for direct and
indirect solicitation, will most certainly lure the avaricious lawyer to weigh
the possibility of obtaining a sizable tort case which will produce a very
large fee on a contingency basis through forbidden means against a
suspension of only three months.36 Certainly the Edwins case must repre-
sent a discouragement to the Committee on Professional Responsibility
which labors at the oars of enforcement of the Code.
Still on rehearing is another case in which the committee's efforts have
thus far been thwarted.37 The problem of the felony tax offender has yet to
be faced by the court. Is a felony tax fraud a serious crime which deprives a
34. Citing Liverman v. Hungerbeeler, 156 La. 297, 100 So. 2d 425 (1925).
35. Citing James, Robinson, Felts, & Starnes v. Powell, 303 So. 2d 229 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1974); Jones v. Bryant, 283 So. 2d 307 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
36. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Edwins, 329 So. 2d 437 (La. 1976).
37. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Ponder, 263 La. 743, 269 So. 2d 228 (1972).
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lawyer of his good moral character? Can the court simply avoid the findings
of a jury that a lawyer has defrauded the United States of its lawful revenues
and say to the offender, "Your good moral character has not been tarnished.
You may continue to practice law!"?
In dealing with problems of discipline, if the supreme court should
follow the reasoning of the Third Circuit advanced in Gray v. Atkins," the
hope of restoring the legal profession to its lofty eminence still remains. The
sordid facts of the Atkins case certainly suggest vigorous supervision of
contingent fee contracts entered into on behalf of a minor. Those same facts
suggest vigorous enforcement of the unauthorized practice statutes.
There can be no doubt that laxity in administering professional
discipline in the area of solicitation-including solicitation by the advance-
ment of living expenses-begets further violations and even a callous
attitude by lawyers that there is no need to be ethical in their relationship
with the public, the courts and their fellow lawyers.
If the court feels that suspension or disbarment is too great a price to
pay for code violations perhaps the institution of a system of severe fines
would get the violator's attention more readily. The fines could be paid into
the Client Security Fund and used to reimburse clients who have suffered
financial losses due to lawyer chicanery.
38. 331 So. 2d 157 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976). See text at note 13, supra.
